Tax Court Overrules Its BMC Software Decision in Analog Devices

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December 5, 2016

In its recent reviewed decision in Analog Devices, the Tax Court revisited and overruled its decision in BMC Software. We previously covered the BMC Software decision and the Fifth Circuit’s reversal of the Tax Court here. Analog Devices involves facts nearly identical to those in BMC Software: The taxpayer claimed a one-time dividends received deduction under section 965 for its 2005 tax year. Pursuant to a 2009 closing agreement with respect to some section 482 adjustments, the taxpayer elected to establish accounts receivable via a closing agreement under Rev. Proc. 99-32 in order to repatriate amounts included in U.S. income for the 2005 tax year (among others). And just as it did in BMC Software, the IRS determined that the retroactive creation of those accounts receivable for 2005 constituted related party indebtedness under section 965(b)(3) for the 2005 tax year, thus reducing the taxpayer’s dividends received deduction for 2005.

Analog Devices is appealable to the First Circuit, and therefore the Fifth Circuit’s decision in BMC Software is not binding precedent under the Golsen rule. Nevertheless, the Tax Court’s decision begins with an explanation of why the court was willing to reconsider its prior decision in BMC Software. Acknowledging the importance of stare decisis, the Tax Court stated that it was “not capriciously disregarding” its prior analysis and held that the principles that it articulated in BMC Software are “not entrenched precedent.” The Tax Court also observed that while its BMC Software decision implicates contract rights (specifically, closing agreements under Rev. Proc. 99-32), it was “unlikely” that the IRS would have relied on BMC Software in structuring later closing agreements.

The Tax Court then proceeded to follow the Fifth Circuit on both issues presented in the case. One issue was whether, as a statutory matter, section 965 required the parties to treat the accounts receivable as related party indebtedness. Following the Fifth Circuit, the Tax Court held that there was no such statutory requirement because section 965(b)(3) looks only to indebtedness “as of the close of the taxable year for which the [section 965] election . . . is in effect.” Because the taxpayer’s closing agreement did not create the accounts receivable until 2009—long after the testing period for the taxpayer’s 2005 year—the Tax Court held that the accounts receivable did not constitute related party indebtedness under section 965.

The other issue was whether the parties had agreed to treat the accounts receivable as related party indebtedness under the closing agreement. In what the Tax Court termed an “introductory phrase,” the closing agreement provided that the accounts receivable were established “for all Federal income tax purposes.” The Commissioner argued that with this language, the parties had agreed to treat the accounts receivable as related party indebtedness for purposes of section 965. But looking to the facts and circumstances of the closing agreement, the Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer made no such agreement. The Tax Court cited law for the principle that each closing agreement is limited to the “matters specifically agreed upon and mentioned in the closing agreement” as well as some self-limiting language in the agreement itself. Since there is no specific mention of section 965 in the agreement, the Tax Court held that to treat the accounts receivable as related party indebtedness would be to ignore the intent of the parties.

But the introductory phrase in the closing agreement in BMC Software—which had the phrase “for Federal income tax purposes”— was different from that in Analog Devices—“for all Federal income tax purposes.” Four judges on the Tax Court concluded that this difference was material and dissented. The dissent invoked interpretive canons for giving effect to the word “all” and addressed the equities of the situation, stating that even if the parties did not bargain over the wording of the introductory phrase, the “wording was not foisted on an unrepresented or unsuspecting taxpayer, or rendered in fine print, or hidden in a footnote, or even inserted in the midst of other terms of the agreement.” Several judges joined in a concurring opinion stating that the dissent “points to a distinction without a difference” and observing that the phrase “for Federal income tax purposes” means the same thing as the phrase “for all Federal income tax purposes.”

If the government appeals Analog Devices (which it may well do given the dissent), we will cover that appeal.

Analog Devices Tax Court Opinion