Supreme Court Denies Cert in Altera

Despite the glut of high-powered amicus briefs in support of the taxpayer’s petition for certiorari and last week’s landmark APA decision on DACA (the relevance of which to the issues in Altera we covered here), the Supreme Court declined to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Altera this morning.

Supreme Court’s DACA Decision May Affect Altera

Altera’s petition for certiorari is pending at the Supreme Court. With the support of several amici, Altera has asked the Court to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision (see our prior coverage here) to uphold the validity of Treasury’s transfer-pricing regulation (Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7A(d)(2)) requiring taxpayers to include employee-stock-option costs in the pool of costs that parties to cost-sharing arrangements must share. Two APA arguments loom large in Altera’s petition. Today’s Supreme Court decision on Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and the APA in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, No. 18-587, may change the complexion of both arguments and provide the Court with an alternative route for the Court in handling Altera’s petition.

In today’s decision, the Court struck down efforts by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to terminate DACA because the initial action by the Acting Secretary of DHS failed to comply with the APA. DHS promulgated DACA in 2012. And in 2014, DHS sought to expand DACA by removing an age cap and creating a new program for parents (DAPA). That expansion was mired in litigation for several years and enjoined by the Fifth Circuit on the grounds that the expansion was more than a mere agency decision to not enforce particular immigration laws.

In 2017, the new administration sought not only to undo that expansion but altogether to rescind DACA, with DHS issuing a memorandum relying on little more than a citation to the Fifth Circuit’s decision (which addressed only the 2014 expansion) and reference to a letter from the Attorney General. The Fifth Circuit decision, however, had been limited to the aspects of the DACA expansion that related to eligibility for some public benefits (and not to the animating policy of forbearing deportations); the Attorney General’s letter reiterated only that the Fifth Circuit decision was correct. The NAACP (among others) challenged the administration’s attempt to rescind DACA based on this DHS memorandum. And in that suit, the D.C. District Court found that DHS’s “conclusory statements [in the memorandum] were insufficient to explain the change in [DHS’s] view of DACA’s lawfulness,” giving DHS a chance to explain itself more fully.

The new DHS Secretary offered up a second memorandum in which she stated that she “decline[d] to disturb” the first memorandum’s DACA rescission. That second memorandum had other conclusory statements and several prudential and policy reasons that were not in the first DHS memorandum. The D.C. District Court found the new explanations insufficient. That case and other related cases were appealed, and the Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari in the California case in which it issued a decision today. The Supreme Court addressed, among other things, “whether the [DHS] rescission [of DACA] was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.”

The Court held that it was. There are two elements to that decision, both of which may bear on Altera’s arguments in its petition for certiorari. First, the Court held that “[d]eciding whether agency action was adequately explained requires, first, knowing where to look for the agency’s explanation.” And the Court held that it would look only to the first, conclusory DHS memorandum because “[i]t is a ‘foundational principle of administrative law’ that judicial review of agency action is limited to ‘the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action.’” This means that DHS could have either (1) issued a new memorandum that better explained the reasoning behind the first memorandum (thus propping up the agency action embodied in the first memorandum) or (2) taken altogether new agency action with a distinct explanation (which new explanation would be subject to a distinct APA review). DHS did not take new action but sought instead to explain its earlier action. In doing so, however, DHS did not offer a better explanation of previously identified reasons, but rather offered reasons that were not in the first memorandum at all. (In the Court’s words, the “reasoning [of the second DHS secretary in the second memorandum] bears little relationship to that of her predecessor.”) The Court elaborated on the reasons why administrative law principles bar agencies from introducing new justifications for agency action after the fact, not the least of which is that “[c]onsidering only contemporaneous explanations for agency action … instills confidence that the reasons given are not simply ‘convenient litigating position[s].’” Therefore, the Court held, “[a]n agency must defend its actions based on the reasons it gave when it acted.”

This element of the Court’s decision goes to the heart of one of Altera’s leading arguments for certiorari. Altera observed that the government pivoted from arguing (in the regulatory preamble and before the Tax Court) that its cost-sharing regulation was consistent with the arm’s-length standard to arguing (in its briefs before the Ninth Circuit) that the addition of the “commensurate-with-income” language to section 482 permitted Treasury to adopt a rule under which a “comparability analysis plays no role in determining” the costs that taxpayers must share. Altera argued that by invoking one rationale in its rulemaking and then invoking a different rationale in litigation, Treasury violated the Chenery rule, which “ensures that an agency cannot say one thing in a rule-making proceeding, and then change its mind as soon as the rule is challenged in court.”

Today’s decision provides some reason to think the Ninth Circuit was incorrect in looking to the rationale that the government offered in litigation to decide whether to uphold the cost-sharing regulation. As Altera has argued extensively, the rationale that the government has offered in litigation bears little resemblance to the reasons offered in the regulatory preamble. And because they offer such different characterizations of how the arm’s-length standard operates, it is difficult to reconcile the former with the latter. If the Ninth Circuit was incorrect in entertaining the government’s rationale offered in litigation, then there are significant problems with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion.

The second element of today’s decision that may be germane to Altera is the Court’s decision that DHS’s action to rescind DACA was “arbitrary and capricious” under the APA. The Court observed that the first DHS memorandum relied almost entirely on the Fifth Circuit’s decision (since the Attorney General letter cited in that memorandum also relied on the Fifth Circuit’s decision). But that Fifth Circuit decision pertained only to the benefit-eligibility features of the DACA expansion and did not address what the Court called the “defining feature” of DACA—“the decision to defer removal (and to notify the affected alien of that decision).” And on that front, the first DHS memorandum “offers no reason for terminating forbearance.” In fact, the Court held, the DHS memorandum “contains no discussion of forbearance or the option of retaining forbearance without benefits” and therefore “‘entirely failed to consider [that] important aspect of the problem’” in violation of the reasoned decision-making standard in the Court’s State Farm decision. In particular, the Court here observed that in taking any action with respect to the forbearance aspects of the DACA rescission, DHS had to consider the consequences of rescission on aliens’ obvious reliance interests.

This second element may affect the outcome with respect to another one of Altera’s APA arguments. Altera argued that the regulation was the result of arbitrary and capricious agency decision-making. Treasury “purported to apply the arm’s-length standard” and “stated that whether that standard is satisfied depends on an empirical and factual analysis of real-world behavior of unrelated parties.” But then, Altera argued, when confronted with “extensive evidence demonstrating that unrelated parties would not share stock-based compensation,” Treasury “ignored or dismissed that evidence because it was inconvenient” and enacted the regulation. There is no dispute that Treasury was aware of that evidence when it finalized the disputed cost-sharing regulation, but Altera has argued that neither Treasury’s regulatory preamble nor the government’s subsequent litigating position adequately address that evidence. Just as DHS’s failure to consider obvious reliance interests in its attempt to rescind DACA created a fatal APA problem, so too, the taxpayer might argue, does Treasury’s failure to consider obvious evidence that runs counter to its cost-sharing regulation when enacting that regulation.

Although the Court’s decision on DACA is directly relevant to issues in Altera, it may not ultimately result in the Supreme Court hearing the case. But the DACA decision gives the Court an opportunity to deal with the Altera decision in a much less labor-intensive way. The Court can issue a “GVR” (grant, vacate, and remand) order, which is a one-paragraph order in which the Court grants certiorari, immediately vacates the judgment below, and remands the case to the court of appeals for “further consideration in light of” a new development not previously considered—usually an intervening Supreme Court decision.

In many cases in which the Court issues such orders, the remanded case is on all fours with the new Supreme Court decision, and the circuit court’s decision on remand is a formality. That would not be true in Altera. Even so, if the Court were to issue such a GVR, it would send a clear message about what the Ninth Circuit would need to do on such a remand. Invoking the GVR procedure would allow the Court to vacate the Ninth Circuit’s Altera decision without having to entertain full briefing and argument. The Court often issues numerous GVR orders on the last day of its Term before breaking for the summer recess. That is usually at the end of June, though the timing could get extended somewhat this year because of the delays in the Court’s spring argument schedule caused by the coronavirus. But some resolution of the pending Altera petition should be expected within the next few weeks.

Supreme Court Opinion – DHS v. Regents of Univ. of Cal

Ninth Circuit Denies Petition for Rehearing

On Tuesday, the Ninth Circuit denied Altera’s petition for rehearing en banc (which petition we discussed in our recent post here). The order issuing that denial includes a strong, 22-page dissent written by Judge Smith and joined by Judges Callahan and Bade. (Ten judges recused themselves, meaning that the vote was 10-3 against rehearing.) The dissent made several arguments for why the petition should have been granted, taking aim at the panel’s reasoning in upholding the regulation and warning about the decision’s broader effects.

Quoting State Farm, the dissent stated that it would have invalidated the regulations because Treasury’s “‘explanation for its decision [ran] counter to the evidence before’ it.” When it promulgated the regulations, Treasury asserted that it was applying the traditional arm’s-length standard, stating that “‘unrelated parties entering into [cost-sharing arrangements] would generally share stock-based compensation costs.’” But the evidence showed that “unrelated entities do not share stock-based compensation costs.”

Although the dissent stated that “[t]his should be the end of our analysis,” it went on to explain why the panel’s decision violates the Chenery rule that courts cannot provide “‘a [purportedly] reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.’” The dissent observed that despite Treasury’s clear statement in the preamble that its cost-sharing rule was “based on a traditional arm’s length analysis employing (unsubstantiated) comparable transactions,” the panel upheld “Treasury’s convenient litigating position on appeal that it permissibly jettisoned the traditional arm’s length standard altogether.” That mismatch undermines the regulation’s validity under APA notice-and-comment principles because Treasury cannot offer one rationale in its preamble, dismiss public comments on that rationale, “and then defend its rule in litigation using reasoning the public never had notice of.” Compounding this notice problem, the panel accepted Treasury’s argument that it could jettison a traditional arm’s length analysis because of the addition of the “commensurate-with-income” sentence to section 482 in 1986. But Treasury had stated in the 1988 White Paper that the addition of that sentence did not amount to a “departure from the arm’s length standard.” So not only did the panel uphold the regulation based on a rationale that Treasury did not offer in its preamble, it also upheld the regulation based on a rationale that Treasury itself had previously disclaimed.

The dissent also took up a cause that we’ve explored here before. By its own terms, the commensurate-with-income provision in section 482 applies only to “transfers of intangible property.” The panel concluded that provision was implicated here because there were “future distribution rights” transferred in Altera’s cost-sharing arrangement. The dissent disagreed because (1) cost-sharing agreements contemplate the “development” of intangibles, which implies that not every intangible subject to the arrangement must have been transferred to the arrangement, and (2) the intangibles enumerated in the pertinent regulation do not include future intangibles because they are all “property types that currently exist.” The dissent therefore concluded that the commensurate-with-income language “simply does not apply to” cost-sharing arrangements.

Finally, the dissent detailed three “particularly deleterious” consequences of the panel’s decision. First, the decision will “likely upset the uniform application of the challenged regulation” because the Tax Court’s decision invalidating the regulation still applies to taxpayers outside of the Ninth Circuit. Second, the decision “tramples on the longstanding reliance interests of American businesses,” many of whom relied not just on the Tax Court unanimously invalidating the regulation but also on Treasury reaffirming the primacy of the arm’s-length standard in the 1988 White Paper and the 2003 regulatory preamble. The dissent observed that these reliance interests are far-reaching because at least 56 major companies have noted the Altera issue in annual reports. Third, the decision threatens international tax law uniformity insofar as the arm’s-length standard (setting aside GILTI and the latest from the OECD) has been the method for allocating taxable income among major developed nations.

At a minimum, the dissent should strengthen the Tax Court’s resolve to invalidate the regulation again for taxpayers from other circuits—the dissent remarked on the “uncommon unanimity and severity of censure” in the Tax Court’s decision. And the dissent can be read as encouragement for Altera to seek certiorari—the dissent stated that the panel’s reversal of a Tax Court decision that would have applied nationwide produces “a situation akin to a circuit split.” Unless extended, the time for Altera to file a petition for certiorari will expire on February 10.

Thanks to Colin Handzo for his help with this post.

Altera – Ninth Circuit Rehearing Denial

Reflections on the Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Amazon.com

Although some time has passed (and we’ve fallen short of our hope here to get something up “soon”), we nevertheless wanted to post some thoughts on the Ninth Circuit’s unanimous affirmance of the taxpayer’s victory in the Tax Court in Amazon.com while also revisiting some of the topics that we covered here after oral argument. The panel’s opinion is brief, but it touched on several important aspects of the law under section 482.

Finding Ambiguity in the Regulatory Definition of “Intangible”

As you’ll recall, the primary dispute on appeal was whether the regulatory definition of “intangible” under Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b) included residual business assets like goodwill, going concern, and the amorphous notions of “growth options” and “culture of continuous innovation” that the government theorized the taxpayer made available in its cost-sharing agreement.

The taxpayer argued that the definition excluded such residual business assets because it did not expressly list them in any of the six subparagraphs of the definition. And the taxpayer argued that the 28 specified items in the regulation all “can be sold independently” from the business while the residual business assets cannot, invoking the statutory-interpretation canon of ejusdem generis to reason that the regulation therefore excludes residual business assets (which cannot be sold without a sale of the entire business).

The government argued that those residual business assets fell under the sixth subparagraph of Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b), which provides that “intangible” includes “other similar items” and that “an item is considered similar … if it derives its value not from its physical attributes but from its intellectual content or other intangible properties.” Since residual business assets do not derive their value from physical attributes but from other intangible properties, the government reasoned, they must be included here. And the government went on to argue that residual business assets must be compensable because otherwise, taxpayers could have transferred assets of value to a cost-sharing arrangement without compensation, which the government asserts would have violated the arm’s-length principle that undergirds section 482 and its regulations.

The panel held that although the taxpayer’s “focus on the commonality of the 28 specified items has some force,” that argument did not carry the day. The panel drew this conclusion from the plain language in the sixth subparagraph: that paragraph does not state that the commonality is that each item “can be sold independently” but rather states that each item “derives its value … from its intellectual content or other intangible properties.” The panel reasoned that the regulation therefore “leaves open the possibility of a non-listed item being included in the definition even if it doesn’t share the attribute of being separately transferable.” The panel thus echoed the concern that Judge Fletcher raised at oral argument—that while the 28 specified items share the commonality of being independently transferable, that commonality is “not the one the text [describing what constitutes a ‘similar item’ under the regulation] gives me.”

Resolving the Ambiguity by Looking to the Drafting History of the Regulation

After concluding that the regulatory definition “is susceptible to, but does not compel, an interpretation that embraces residual-business assets,” the panel looked to the overall regulatory scheme but held that to be inconclusive. The panel then turned to the drafting history of Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b) and found it to show that Treasury’s 1994 final regulations (which amended the sixth subparagraph of Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b)) both (1) exclude residual business assets from the definition of intangible and (2) provide reason to think that the definition of “intangible” includes only independently transferable assets.

The panel described how when Treasury issued temporary and proposed regulations in 1993, it asked “whether the definition of intangible property … should be expanded to include … goodwill or going concern value.” The panel concluded that since Treasury asked whether the definition should be “expanded” to include residual business assets, those assets were not included in the then-existing definition. And when Treasury issued final regulations in 1994 without expressly enumerating goodwill or going concern value in that definition, Treasury stated that its final rule “merely ‘clarified’ when an item would be deemed similar to the 28 items listed in the definition.” The panel concluded that by its own admission, Treasury would have needed to “expand” the definition to include residual business assets but instead opted to merely “clarif[y]” its definition, and therefore Treasury did not intend for the 1994 final regulations to include residual business assets.

Moreover, Treasury’s 1993 regulations limited the universe of compensable intangibles to “any commercially transferable interest.” But when it issued final regulations in 1994, Treasury dropped the “commercially transferable interest” language because “it was superfluous: if the property was not commercially transferable, then it could not have been transferred in a controlled transaction.” The panel concluded that the transfer-pricing regulations thus “contemplate a situation in which particular assets are transferred from one entity to another.” Since Treasury stated that it would have been “superfluous” to expressly state that the definition of “intangible” includes only commercially transferable assets, the panel held that the regulatory history “strongly supports Amazon’s position that Treasury limited the definition of ‘intangible’ to independently transferable assets.”

That the panel found this history dispositive comes as no surprise. We observed in our prior post that both Judge Callahan and Judge Christen recounted the regulatory history, with Judge Callahan questioning government counsel about whether Treasury ever expressed an intent to expand the definition to include residual business assets.

What Is the Rationale for Including Only Independently Transferable Assets in the Definition of Intangible?

Although the panel’s explanation for how it concluded that the definition of intangibles includes only independently transferable assets is explicit, the rationale for why Treasury would include only independently transferable assets is markedly subtler. It’s possible, however, to cobble together an explanation from other statements in the decision.

The first clue is when the panel looked to the genesis of the cost-sharing regulations, where Treasury identified “intangibles as being the product of R&D efforts.” In that sense, the panel reasoned, the “regulations seem to exclude” residual business assets, “which ‘are generated by earning income, not by incurring deductions.’” This distinction is clear enough—businesses incur expenses in undertaking R&D efforts, while goodwill and going concern value are byproducts of a well-run and successful business.

Why does this distinction matter? One answer lies in the legislative history and policy underpinnings for the statutory definition of “intangibles.” As the panel observed in a footnote, the “Senate Report states that the Committee viewed the bill as combatting the practice of transferring intangibles ‘created, developed or acquired in the United States’ to foreign entities to generate income tax free.” Which is to say that one animating concern in defining intangibles was to prevent U.S. entities from developing intangibles domestically but then transferring those intangibles to foreign affiliates whose income is not subject to U.S. tax.

And the reason why this is a concern for intangibles that result from R&D and other independently transferrable assets but not goodwill or going-concern value should be apparent: while the former involve expenditures that are deductible against U.S. income (but where the asset transfer will prevent the income from being taxed in the U.S.), the latter involve assets that exist only if the taxpayer has generated business income in the U.S. in the first place. In other words, the definition of “intangible” was initially meant to prevent taxpayers from incurring expenses to create intangibles in the U.S. and deducting those expenses against U.S. income, but then turning around and transferring those intangibles to foreign affiliates that may not owe U.S. tax on the income resulting from those intangibles.

Distinguishing the Definition of “Intangibles” from the Value of Those Intangibles

On brief and at oral argument, the government repeatedly cited deposition testimony by one of the taxpayer’s experts in which that expert admitted that parties at arm’s length would pay for residual business assets. The government tried to leverage that admission to argue that the arm’s-length standard itself means that residual business assets are compensable because “it is undisputed that a company entering into the same transaction under the same circumstances with an unrelated party would have required compensation.”

The panel addressed that argument in a footnote, holding that the government’s argument “misses the mark.” The panel explained that while the arm’s-length standard “governs the valuation of intangibles; it doesn’t answer whether an item is an intangible.” This is a decisive response to the government’s arguments; it cannot be the case that any value associated with a business falls under the definition of “intangible.”

Putting Footnote 1 in Context

One aspect of the panel’s decision that is certain to receive attention in future transfer-pricing disputes is the discussion in the first footnote. In that footnote, the panel described the 2009 changes to the cost-sharing regulations as “broadening the scope of contributions for which compensation must be made” and explained that the TCJA “amended the definition of ‘intangible property’” in section 936(h)(3)(b). The footnote then stated that “[i]f this case were governed by the 2009 regulations or by the 2017 statutory amendment, there is no doubt the Commissioner’s position would be correct.”

There are a few things worth noting about this footnote, the first of which is arguably the most important: It’s dicta. The question of whether residual assets are compensable under the 2009 cost-sharing regulations or the 2017 statutory amendment was not before the court. And since the panel says nearly nothing in the footnote about the language in those 2009 regulations or the TCJA amendment, there is no reason to think that the panel gave material consideration to whether the outcome in the case would have been different under either.

Second, given some of the panel’s other statements, it is not so clear that “there is no doubt the Commissioner’s position would be correct” for years after the 2009 changes to the regulations. Recall that the government’s case was predicated on charging a higher buy-in for the purported transfer of “growth options” and a “culture of continuous innovation” to the cost-sharing arrangement. Although the 2009 regulatory amendments changed the cost-sharing regulations and TCJA amended the statutory definition for “intangibles,” there was no change to the definition under Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b). That regulation provides that an item not otherwise specified is an intangible only if it “has substantial value independent of the services of any individual.” The panel itself expressed serious doubt about whether the purported intangibles in this case met that requirement, stating that “residual business assets, such as ‘growth options’ and a ‘culture of innovation,’ are amorphous, and it’s not self-evident whether such assets have ‘substantial value independent of the services of any individual.’”

Finally, the TCJA amendments would affect the result in the case only if the purported “growth options” and “culture of continuous innovation” are items of property that fall under the new statutory category of “goodwill, going concern value, or workforce in place” or constitute an item “the value or potential value of which is not attributable to … the services of any individual.” But there is reason to think that the government is itself unconvinced that “growth options” and “culture of continuous innovation” fall under that new statutory category. At oral argument, the panel asked government counsel why, if Treasury meant to expand the definition of “intangible” with its 1994 changes, Treasury didn’t just add “goodwill and going concern” to the list. In response, government counsel argued that merely adding “goodwill and going concern” to the list would not have solved anything because then taxpayers would just fight about whether particular assets fell under those additions to the list. The government cannot coherently maintain both that (1) Treasury could not have achieved the Commissioner’s desired result in this case by expanding the regulatory list to include goodwill and going concern in 1994 and (2) Congress’s addition of goodwill and going concern to the list in TCJA would change the result in this case. Even though Congress meant to change the result in cases like this, government counsel’s argument suggests an absence of faith that expanding the list succeeds in changing the result.

Whether the Commissioner’s Litigating Position Warrants Auer Deference

The government also argued that under Auer, the Tax Court should have deferred to the Commissioner’s interpretation of Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b) as including residual business assets. The panel rejected this argument for two reasons.

First, the panel found that pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor, the Commissioner’s interpretation warrants Auer deference only if the regulation is “genuinely ambiguous.” The panel states that Auer thus implicates a higher standard for ambiguity. Under that standard, a regulation is “genuinely ambiguous” for Auer purposes only if ambiguity remains once the court has exhausted the traditional tools of construction, which requires it to consider “the text, structure, history, and purpose of a regulation.” The panel concluded that the text of Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b), its place in the transfer-pricing regulations, and its rulemaking history “leave little room for the Commissioner’s proffered meaning.” The panel’s holding is therefore that the definition of “intangible” under Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b) is ambiguous but not genuinely ambiguous.

Second, the panel also rejected the government’s deference argument because the government first advanced an interpretation of Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b) in the litigation that had never appeared in the drafting history of the regulations or anywhere else. As we remarked earlier, reliance concerns loomed large at oral argument, and especially in Judge Callahan’s questions. The panel’s conclusion that “Amazon and other taxpayers were not given fair warning of the Commissioner’s current interpretation of the regulatory definition of an ‘intangible’” was thus foreseeable from oral argument.

Whether the Cost-Sharing Regulations Provide a Safe Harbor

As we observed in our prior post, at oral argument the government disavowed the notion that the Treasury Regulations create a safe-harbor for cost-sharing arrangements. We surmised that whether the Ninth Circuit agreed with the government on this point might be pivotal in the outcome.

While the extent to which that issue factored into the panel’s decision is not evident, the panel’s decision is entirely consistent with the notion that cost sharing operates as a safe harbor. First, the panel described cost sharing as “an alternative to licensing … under which [the parties to the cost-sharing arrangement] become co-owners of intangibles as a result of the entities’ joint R&D efforts.” If the cost-sharing arrangement qualifies, then it “provides the taxpayer the benefit of certainty because … new intangibles need not be valued as they are developed.” But the panel explained that the certainty comes at a price—the R&D payments by the foreign cost-sharing participants “serve to reduce the deductions the [domestic] taxpayer can take for the R&D costs (thereby increasing tax liability).” What the panel thus described operates like a safe harbor—taxpayers that ensure that their cost-sharing arrangements qualify and sacrifice some deductions for intangible development costs can gain certainty that their intangibles need not be re-valued. The panel’s decision will hamper any future IRS arguments that cost-sharing does not operate like a safe harbor.

Procedural Status

The government did not file a petition for rehearing in the case; the mandate issued on October 8. There is still time for the government to file a petition for certiorari; it is due November 14.

Ninth Circuit Affirms Tax Court in Amazon.com

In a unanimous opinion issued today, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the taxpayer’s victory in the Tax Court in Amazon.com. We previously covered the case and oral argument here. We will take some time to digest the opinion and post on its finer points soon. In the meantime, one key sentence in the opinion is worth noting because it appears to capture the thrust of the Ninth Circuit’s decision about the disputed scope of the relevant regulatory definition for the term “intangible”: “Although the language of the definition is ambiguous, the drafting history of the regulations shows that ‘intangible’ was understood to be limited to independently transferable assets.”

Amazon.com Ninth Circuit Opinion

Petition for Rehearing En Banc Filed in Altera

As most expected, Altera filed a petition for rehearing en banc after the reconstituted three-judge panel decided to reverse the Tax Court’s invalidation of Treasury’s cost-sharing regulations. (A link to the petition is below.) As we explained previously, those regulations have been the subject of much controversy over the last two decades, and the success that Xilinx had with its petition for rehearing several years ago made it likely that Altera would ask for rehearing.

The petition picks up on one of the themes we discussed in our most recent post here. The taxpayer takes aim at the majority’s conclusion that the “commensurate with income” language added to section 482 in 1986 is relevant in the cost-sharing context. The taxpayer argues that language was aimed at addressing a different issue from the one before the court here—“how to value transfers of existing intangible property from one related entity to another” and not “intangible property yet to be created.”

The taxpayer makes four or five (the petition combines arguments (3) and (4) below) arguments for why its petition should be granted:

(1) The decision upsets settled principles about the application of the arm’s-length standard because the majority permitted Treasury to “cast aside the settled arm’s-length standard” for “a new standard” that is “purely internal.”

(2) The decision “validates bad rulemaking” because, contrary to the majority’s account of the regulation’s history, “[n]o one involved in the rulemaking thought the IRS was interpreting ‘commensurate with income’ to justify a new standard that did not depend on empirical evidence.” And under the law in Chenery, the court must assess the “‘propriety of [the agency’s] action solely by the grounds invoked by the [agency]’ in the administrative record.”

(3) The decision is irreconcilable with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Xilinx, which held that parties would not share in employee stock option costs at arm’s length.

(4) The decision “threatens the uniform application of the tax law” because, under the Golsen rule, the Tax Court will continue to apply its unanimous decision declaring the regulation invalid to cases arising anywhere outside the Ninth Circuit.

(5) As evidenced by the glut of amicus briefs, the treatment of employee stock options in cost-sharing arrangements is “exceptionally important.”

It is likely that additional amicus briefs will be filed in support of the rehearing petition. And given the prominence of the issue, we anticipate that the court will order the government to file a response to the petition. We will report on further developments as warranted.

Altera Petition for Rehearing En Banc July 2019

Observations on Changes in the Ninth Circuit’s Second Altera Decision

As we posted earlier here (with a link to the new decision), the Ninth Circuit issued a new decision in Altera after replacing the late Judge Reinhardt with Judge Graber on the panel. But the result was the same as the withdrawn July 2018 decision—the Ninth Circuit upheld the validity of Treasury’s cost-sharing regulation that requires taxpayers to include the cost of employee stock options under qualifying cost sharing arrangements (QCSAs). Today, we present some observations after comparing the majority and dissent in the new decision with those in the Ninth Circuit’s withdrawn decision.

In the new decision, Judge Thomas recycled much of the language and logic from his withdrawn opinion, and Judge O’Malley reused much of her original dissent. Although they are few, some changes in the two opinions are interesting and notable. Overall, the changes serve to sharpen the disagreements between the parties (and the disagreements between the majority and dissent) in ways that will focus the discussion in the likely event of a rehearing en banc petition (or possible petition for certiorari). We focus here on two aspects of the changes.

Was There a Transfer of Intangibles that Implicated the Commensurate-With-Income Language in the Second Sentence of Section 482?

The majority did not address this issue in its withdrawn opinion, so some background is in order. When Treasury proposed cost-sharing regulations that explicitly required related parties to include employee-stock-option costs in the pool of shared costs, commenters put forward evidence that unrelated parties do not share employee-stock-option costs. But Treasury did not heed those comments and ultimately determined that the arm’s-length standard would be met if the regulations required taxpayers in QCSAs to include the cost of employee stock options in the pool of shared costs, regardless of what a comparability analysis might show about whether unrelated parties share those costs. So in order to uphold the Treasury Regulations, the majority had to conclude that the arm’s-length standard under section 482 does not mandate the use of comparable transactions.

In reaching that conclusion, the majority relied on the history of section 482 and especially on the addition of the second sentence of section 482. That second sentence provides that “[i]n the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property…, the income with respect to such transfer or license shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.” The majority held that the Congressional intent behind the addition of that language in 1986 is what made it reasonable for Treasury to conclude that it was permitted “to dispense with a comparable transaction analysis in the absence of actual comparable transactions.”

Was there a “transfer (or license) of intangible property” such that Treasury could invoke the commensurate-with-income language to justify dispensing with a comparable-transaction analysis? There was indeed a transfer of intangibles at the outset of the QCSA in this case; Altera transferred intangible property to its QCSA with its foreign subsidiary. But that initial transfer is unrelated to the disputed employee-stock-option costs. Those stock-option costs relate to subsequently developed intangibles, not to the value of the pre-existing intangibles that Altera initially contributed. Then-applicable Treasury Regulation § 1.482-7A(g)(2) required a buy-in payment only for “pre-existing intangibles.”

It is, then, wholly unclear how those employee-stock-option costs for as-yet undeveloped intangibles constitute a “transfer (or license) of intangible property” such that the commensurate-with-income language is implicated at all. The taxpayer argued—both in its initial and supplemental briefing—that by its own terms, the commensurate-with-income language is not implicated once a QCSA is in place and therefore that language is irrelevant to the dispute. The taxpayer reasoned that “no ‘transfer (or license)’ occurs when entities develop intangibles jointly” because jointly developed intangibles “are not transferred or licensed between the parties, but rather are owned upon their creation by each participant.”

The majority said little about this issue in its withdrawn opinion and did not address the taxpayer’s argument. In its new opinion, the majority addressed the argument and declared itself “unpersuaded.” It held that “[w]hen parties enter into a QCSA, they are transferring future distribution rights to intangibles, albeit intangibles that are yet to be developed.” The majority does not, however, explain how “intangibles that are yet to be developed” are “pre-existing intangible property” under Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7A(g)(2) or, perhaps more importantly, how such undeveloped future intangibles can constitute intangible assets at all under the words of the statute. Instead, the majority leaned on the language in the second sentence of section 482 providing that the commensurate-with-income standard applies to “any” transfer of intangible property, holding that “that phrasing is as broad as possible, and it cannot reasonably be read to exclude the transfers of expected intangible property.”

The dissent seized on whether there was any transfer of intangibles that implicated the commensurate-with-income language. The dissent stated that “[t]he plain text of the statute limits the application of the commensurate with income standard to only transfers or licenses of intangible property.” And it observed that there is a contradiction between the majority’s conclusion that QCSAs “constitute transfers of already existing property” and Treasury’s own characterization (in the very preamble of the disputed regulations) of QCSAs “as arrangements ‘for the development of high-profit intangibles,’” inferring that parties cannot transfer something that is not yet developed. The dissent concluded that Treasury’s failure to make “a finding that QCSAs constitute transfers of intangible property” should be, as a matter of review under the APA, fatal to Treasury’s cost-sharing regulations.

Has the Arm’s-Length Standard Historically Required a Comparable-Transaction Analysis?

The majority made several changes from its withdrawn opinion in its account of the history of the arm’s-length standard under section 482. The changes appear to be aimed at bolstering the majority’s conclusion that Treasury was justified in concluding that the arm’s-length standard does not necessitate a comparable-transaction analysis. These changes take a couple of forms.

First, the changes add justifications for the proposition that the arm’s-length standard has not always mandated a comparable-transaction analysis in all cases. The withdrawn opinion included some evidence for this historical account, recounting the Tax Court’s Seminole Flavor decision from 1945 (where the Tax Court “rejected a strict application of the arm’s length standard in favor of an inquiry into whether the allocation…was ‘fair and reasonable’”). In its new opinion, the majority added the observation that Treasury provided for an unspecified fourth method for pricing intangibles in its 1968 regulations. And the majority refined its discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s 1962 decision in Frank, still quoting the language from that opinion denying that “‘arm’s length bargaining’ is the sole criterion for applying” section 482 (as it did in the withdrawn opinion) but then adding the new assertion that the “central point” of Frank is that “the arm’s length standard based on comparable transactions was not the sole basis” for reallocating costs and income under section 482. (As the dissent pointed out, a later Ninth Circuit decision limited the holding in Frank to the complex circumstances in that case and noted that the parties in Frank had stipulated to apply a standard other than the arm’s-length standard.)

Second, the majority made changes to add a series of new and more sweeping assertions that under section 482, Treasury has always had the leeway to dispense with comparable-transaction analyses in deriving the correct arm’s-length price. For instance, as a rejoinder to the taxpayer’s argument that the arm’s-length standard requires a comparable-transaction analysis, the majority wrote that “historically the definition of the arm’s length standard has been a more fluid one” and that “courts for more than half a century have held that a comparable transaction analysis was not the exclusive methodology to be employed under the statute.” It added similarly broad historical statements elsewhere in the new opinion, all in service of concluding that Treasury acted reasonably in dispensing with a comparable-transaction analysis in its cost-sharing regulations: “[a]s demonstrated by nearly a century of interpreting § 482 and its precursor, the arm’s length standard is not necessarily confined to one methodology” (p. 33); “the arm’s length standard has historically been understood as more fluid than Altera suggests” (p. 41); and “[g]iven the long history of the application of other methods…Treasury’s understanding of its power to use methodologies other than a pure transactional comparability analysis was reasonable” (p. 49).

In one of the subtler but more interesting changes from the withdrawn opinion, the majority’s new opinion removed a single word. In its withdrawn opinion, the majority said that Treasury’s 1988 White Paper “signaled a dramatic shift in the interpretation of the arm’s length standard” by advancing the “basic arm’s length return method…that would apply only in the absence of comparable transactions….” (emphasis added). But consistent with its conclusion in the new opinion that “for most of the twentieth century the arm’s length standard explicitly permitted the use of flexible methodology,” the majority appears to have concluded that shift in the White Paper was not so “dramatic,” dropping that word altogether in its new opinion. (In this vein, the majority also removed its assertion in the withdrawn opinion that “[t]he novelty of the 1968 regulations was their focus on comparability.”)

The new dissenting opinion disputed the majority’s historical account, stating that the first sentence of section 482 “has always been viewed as requiring an arm’s length standard” and that before the 1986 amendment, the Ninth Circuit “believed that an arm’s length standard based on comparable transactions was the sole basis for allocating costs and income under the statute in all but the narrow circumstances outlined in Frank.” And the dissent observed that even with the 1986 addition of the commensurate-with-income language, “Congress left the first sentence of § 482—the sentence that undisputedly incorporates the arm’s length standard—intact,” thus requiring a comparable-transaction analysis everywhere that comparable transactions can be found. The dissent pointed out that the White Paper clarified that this was true “even in the context of transfers or licenses of intangible property,” quoting Treasury’s own statement in the White Paper that in that context the “‘intangible income must be allocated on the basis of comparable transactions if comparables exist.’”

Briefing Complete in Kisor

The petitioner has now filed his reply brief in Kisor, and the case is fully briefed in preparation for the oral argument later this week on March 27.  Given the government’s partial retreat from defending Auer deference (see our prior post here), which the petitioner describes as a “sharp retreat,” the reply brief responds to two different briefs.  First, it responds directly to an amicus brief by a group of law professors (linked in our prior post) that put forth a full-throated defense of Auer deference.  Second, it acknowledges that the government’s “Auer-light” position is “preferable to existing Auer deference,” but it still rejects that position and argues that complete overruling of Auer is the correct approach.  The reply brief concludes that the existing principles of Skidmore deference satisfactorily address the policy goals described in the government’s brief without improperly permitting “an agency to exert its expertise in binding fashion without any participation by the regulated public.”

Kisor – Petitioner Reply Brief

 

Treasury and IRS Issue Joint Policy Statement on the Tax Regulatory Process

Earlier this week, the Treasury Department issued a policy statement on the tax regulatory process.  A significant section of the statement describes the approach that will be taken in Tax Court litigation to arguments based on judicial deference to regulations.  Treasury states that it will not claim Auer deference in such litigation to interpretations set forth in subregulatory guidance, such as revenue rulings, nor will it claim Chevron deference to such interpretations.  That apparent abandonment of Auer deference arguments goes beyond the position the Justice Department has taken in the Supreme Court in the Kisor case, where the government has argued for a significant narrowing of Auer but stops short of stating that it should be overruled.  See our reports on Kisor here.  Note that the Treasury Department statement by its terms applies only to Tax Court litigation, which is handled by the IRS, not to refund suits where the Justice Department handles the litigation.

The Treasury Department statement also addresses topics other than judicial deference, including: when to issue subregulatory guidance; legislative vs. interpretative regulations; and temporary regulations.  For a fuller analysis of the Treasury Department statement, please read this Miller & Chevalier Tax Alert.

Government Brief Filed in Kisor

The government was faced with something of a dilemma in filing its response brief in the Kisor case addressing the level of deference owed to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation. See our prior reports here. On the one hand, the government was defending the agency action in this case and the decision below, which rested on paying Auer deference to the agency’s interpretation. On the other hand, conservative legal theorists have long been critical of Auer deference, following Justice Scalia’s lead, and the views of the political appointees in this administration about Auer likely range from unenthused to hostile. But on the third hand, the government’s institutional interests would generally be better served by a strong principle of Auer deference, since that would make challenges to agency action more difficult.

The government’s brief attempts to juggle these conflicting imperatives, and the result is a bit schizophrenic. The bottom line is that the government argues that Auer should not be overruled, but that its applicability should be substantially narrowed. In the end, the government does not rely on Auer to defend the agency action in this case, but instead argues that the regulation is clear on its face without the need to consider the agency interpretation at all.  (Although outgunned by the cascade of amicus briefs filed in support of the petitioner, two amicus briefs were filed on the government’s side, including one by a group of administrative law professors (linked below) who argue that Auer “is sound and should be maintained.”)

The first, and longest, section of the government’s brief is a full-fledged assault on the doctrine of Auer deference. The government contends that the doctrine: (1) is not well grounded historically; (2) is not supported by any consistent rationale; (3) is in tension with the APA’s distinction between interpretive and legislative rules; and (4) can have harmful practical consequences by discouraging agency resort to notice-and-comment rulemaking. Notably, the government states that the reasons that support Chevron deference do not apply to Auer, and thus the brief does not signal that the current administration will argue against Chevron deference in a future case.

The government argues, however, that Auer should not be overruled because of stare decisis considerations, including that doing so “would upset significant private reliance interests” because it allegedly “could call into question” earlier decisions that rested on Auer deference. In contrast to the opening part of its brief, this section praises Auer deference where it is limited to “its core applications,” such as “when the agency announces its interpretation in advance in a widely available guidance document.” The government states that the task of choosing among reasonable interpretations is more appropriately performed by administrators than by judges, that Auer deference would promote national uniformity, that it recognizes the technical expertise of agencies, and that it fosters regulatory certainty and predictability—in contrast to a system “in which the meaning of a regulation must be determined de novo in every judicial proceeding.” In addition, the government disagrees with the petitioner’s argument that Auer deference poses a separation-of-powers problem, stating that an agency’s actions in making rules and conducting adjudications are both exercises of “executive power.”

Accordingly, the government proposes “significant limits” on the doctrine that will thread the needle, neither overruling Auer nor further entrenching it. First, the government states that deference should not be paid to an agency interpretation that is “unreasonable,” describing this seemingly benign limitation as a “rigorous predicate.” If the agency interpretation is judged to be within the range of reasonable readings of the regulation, then the government argues that deference is appropriate “only if the interpretation was issued with fair notice to regulated parties; is not inconsistent with the agency’s prior views; rests on the agency’s expertise; and represents the agency’s considered view, as distinct from the views of mere field officials or other low-level employees.”

It is hard to say at this point what the Court will do with the various permutations that have been presented to it for moving forward, but it appears that Auer deference in its current form stands on very shaky ground.

Oral argument is scheduled for March 27.

Kisor – Government Response Brief

Kisor – Amicus Brief by Administrative Law Scholars in Support of Auer

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